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Security Information

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 3

6 March 1953

SUBJECT: Address of the Vice President of the United States, the Honorable Richard Nixon

1. The Vice President, the Honorable Richard Nixon, at the Ninth Agency Orientation Course, on 10 February 1953 presented an address on the current world situation.

2. The Vice President pointed out that he was presenting his subject from a Congressional point of view, and as representing Congressional opinion. His address should not, therefore, be interpreted in its entirety as representing current national policy.

3. Some of the subjects on which the Vice President commented are, of course, controversial, but it is believed that his speech and his point of view will be of universal interest throughout the Agency.

[redacted]

MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

25X1

Attachment: 1

Distribution No. 4 with
routing to all employees



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ADDRESS OF THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

THE HONORABLE RICHARD NIXON

AT THE

NINTH AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE

10 February 1953

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When Mr. Dulles invited me to talk before this group, I had very grave doubts as to what I might be able to contribute to this program. That you are all experts or potential experts in a very specialized field was clear to me when I read the contents of the printed program showing both the coverage of subject matter and the biographic sketches of the participants. I, therefore, know that I would be out of my depth were I to attempt to compete with intelligence experts in talking to you. Thus, it appeared that my most appropriate contribution to this training course should come from a recognition of your interest in gathering and analyzing facts which are then used as the basis for forming National Intelligence Estimates for the National Security Council of which I am a statutory member. Further, realizing that whatever is done in the formulation of foreign policy must in the final analysis receive the support and approval of the Congress, I felt I would attempt something which is rather unusual--namely, analyze the current situation with which we are confronted in the world as seen through the eyes of an average U.S. Congressman or Senator. This I can do because I have been an average Congressman and Senator. This I would like to do because much misunderstanding exists in the Executive Departments and Agencies regarding the Congress, both House and Senate, much of which is attributable to a tendency to be overly fearful of what the Congressman or Senator is going to think or do and, hence, what must be done to make him act in "proper fashion."

I came to the House in 1947 just at the beginning of the period when we were developing the programs which you are working with and under today. That was the year of CIA's creation in the National Security Act of 1947. Naturally, what I say will be colored to a great extent by my own background and experiences. However, in working up my thoughts today I have attempted to make them representative of the thoughts of most of the Senators and Congressmen, both Republican and Democrats--probably more Republicans--who believe that some changes in the direction and attitudes of our foreign, military and security policies need to be made.



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First, I believe it is appropriate to start with an analysis of our foreign policy as inherited from the past administration. The first question we have to ask ourselves is whether this policy ought to be continued as is--intact--or modified to some degree. Fairness demands that we pose the query as to whether or not that policy has been successful. To answer this question we must go back at least to the end of World War II--the most costly war in the history of the world. That was the time when the people of the United States had great hopes for the future, with our complete military superiority, based justifiably on the possession of the best Army, Navy and Air Force plus the monopoly of the atomic bomb. In scanning the peoples of the world we felt that all were on our side with the exception of possibly 180 million to 200 million in the USSR and the satellites. Such was the situation at the end of World War II.

Since that time the Congress has appropriated approximately 100 billion dollars for military purposes and about 33 to 35 billion for foreign aid, most of which has gone to Europe.

We also developed certain plans and programs--the Greek-Turkish Aid Program, the Marshall Plan, and others which were designed to stop the march of aggressive Communism throughout the world and to roll back that tide. But as we analyze the results of that policy today and after all, people in political life think usually in terms of results and not in terms of causes and excuses, no matter how good those excuses may be, I believe that most of us get somewhat of a shock in finding that we have lost our military supremacy--though not completely, certainly to a great degree. For example, we are stronger in strategic air power but we are definitely weaker in tactical air. Even though we are more powerful on the sea, I think even good Navy men, and I happen to be one, will admit that we are probably weaker under the sea. We no longer have a monopoly on the atomic bomb although, of course, we derive consolation from our conviction that we have many more and better ones than our enemy.

As far as peoples in the world are concerned, and that, of course, is the most dramatic part of this analysis, we find that we have lost 600 million people to Communist control, for various reasons, some of them probably pretty good.

Now those are the facts--the facts which concern the average U.S. Congressman, the average U.S. Senator, and accordingly the average American. Since this policy seems to have failed in some instances, the question arises as to how this did happen.

At this point I reject two extremes that probably you will find today in the Congress of the United States and through our country.



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One extreme contends that the only reason this happened is because the people that made the policy intended it that way. This morning I do not intend to go into any detail on the question of disloyalty in the Government. But without minimizing the importance of this problem, I think any reasonable person rejects the idea that the failures we have had in foreign policy since World War II have to any considerable extent been caused because those who made the policies deliberately intended that they fail.

At the other extreme is the fatalistic view of those who say that the results were inevitable because of the cleverness and aggressiveness of imperialistic Russian Communism. Proponents of this view conclude that the chicanery and subversive methods of the Soviets in their use of means that we would never adopt brought results which gave them their great successes and gains and that nothing we could or would have done would have changed the results.

I repeat that both of these extreme viewpoints must be rejected because I think that there is another ground which represents better the thinking of the great majority of the members of the House and the Senate and which I believe is representative of the American viewpoint. Frankly, it doesn't make a great deal of difference why it happened, except, perhaps, from the academic standpoint we may avoid the errors of tomorrow by examining the mistakes of yesterday. Today it doesn't make a great deal of difference to stable, current, national security whether those who made the policies intended them to fail or whether the failures were due to bad judgment. The important fact of the moment is that we are confronted with current errors in policy and recognizing the mistakes we must develop new policies that will not contain in them the seeds of error which caused the failures of our present policies.

At this point I believe some general conclusions can be drawn. In the first place I think the great basic error which has caused our present difficulties is that we misjudged the character of the world Communist conspiracy. It was, perhaps, quite easy to do that. All of us who served in World War II welcomed the participation of the Russians in that war. We recognized the great contribution that they made and we were happy in the realization that the assistance of Russia cut down the contributions and sacrifices that would have to be made by American men and American women. But as a result of this and because of very clever propaganda in the United States by persons whom we have since learned to recognize as actually serving the conspiracy of international Communism, an idea grew up even in high places in the United States that the Communist movement, the Communists, themselves, the power center of the Soviet Union, were all segments of a great peace-loving democracy and that you could therefore, trust the men in the Kremlin



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and believe what they said at the conference table. Yalta and Potsdam were primarily the results of that mistaken concept. Though some of those who attended the conferences had serious doubts about the sincerity of Soviet expressions, we know that these doubts were not ventilated in the open and removed. If they were made known at all, it was not until after the conferences took place. Thus, we must reach the conclusion that one of the basic reasons for the difficulties that exist today goes back to the concessions that were made at these conferences and that such concessions were granted because of a fundamental error in judging the character of the men in the Kremlin who run the Communist conspiracy.

Even after we began to recognize the fact that the men in the Kremlin could not be trusted at the conference table, we note a second fundamental error which, of course, is related to the first, viz., that we failed to realize that the Soviets were engaged in a conspiracy--a revolutionary conspiracy to overthrow the free nations. Even when we did realize this fact, we failed to appreciate fully the global character of that conspiracy. There was a theory, which, incidentally, is still prevalent in some places and can be sustained by fairly effective argument, holding that what we are confronted with in the world today is not World Communism but simply Russian imperialism which has taken the form of Communism. Hence, as we look over the past seven years, we find that in too many places there were people who said Communism was a danger within Russia. Some people of this kind would go even further and say that Communism was dangerous in Germany and possibly in Greece, in Turkey, in France, in Italy, but that Communism in Asia, and specifically Communism in China and in the United States was a different kind altogether. Such oversimplification, I remind you, is an effort to give you the average thinking of those in the national legislature which is representative of the country at large. The result of that line of thinking is quite obvious because it was the basis for what happened in China and, of course, what happened in China caused what happened in Korea. From my own experience I give you an example which I think points up the falsity of that approach and which, at the same time, proves the point that Communism is a global conspiracy, as President Eisenhower said in his State-of-the-Union message.

I was in Europe in 1947 with the Herter Committee. Allen Dulles was one of our advisers, without pay as I recall, and he did an excellent job. I am sure he will agree with me when I make the observation that if more members of the House and Senate could go on such trips, we would experience less difficulty in getting programs through the House and the Senate which are needed for the security of the country. The Herter Committee, as you recall, was making studies as to the needs of





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the various countries of Europe for Marshall Plan funds. Our recommendations to the House were in large part accepted and resulted in the adoption of the ECA program in the House and, of course, its counterpart, in the Senate. On that European trip some of us made it a point not only to talk to the heads of the governments which were anti-Communist in the countries which we visited, but whenever and wherever we could we got an audience or an interview with the Communist leaders. This was of particular interest to me because I wanted to see what made them tick.

I remember on one occasion a very interesting conversation I had with Togliatti, the leader of the Communist party in Italy. One segment I remember quite vividly. I informed him that I was a member of the Labor Committee of the United States House of Representatives and that, consequently, I was interested in his thinking on labor problems. I said, "Mr. Togliatti: In the event that the Communists take over in Italy (the Italian elections were coming up within a few months) what kind of a program would you favor as far as labor is concerned? Do you believe, for example, that labor unions should be free of government control, and that the right to strike should be protected and guaranteed?"

A translation was made--he thought a moment, and his answer to these questions was "Yes." Obviously, he had to answer in this fashion because he was not in power at that time. After the answer was given I told him I was very glad to hear his reply because that was the kind of policy we had in the United States.

Then I added, "Labor unions are free in the United States and, of course, strikes are going on right now. Of course, you realize, Mr. Togliatti, that in the Soviet Union such is not the case because the labor unions there are completely dominated and controlled by the government and the right to strike is denied."

The translation was made and he looked at me in a not-too-friendly manner and said: "Well, I don't think that the Congressman and I understand each other. The reason why the right to strike has to be guaranteed in the United States or in any capitalist country is that there the labor policy is dominated by employers, reactionaries and capitalists. Therefore, the workers must have some protection against such exploiters. But in the Soviet Union we have no employers, reactionaries or capitalists and, hence, the right to strike need not be guaranteed in the USSR."

I said: "That is very interesting. Now let me ask you another question. In our conversation up to this point you have been extremely critical of the foreign policy of the United States. Certainly, you cannot contend that all of what you call 'aggressive intent, aggressive actions and imperialism' is on the side of the United States.



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Do you have any criticism whatever of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union on the ground that it is imperialistic? After all, you are an Italian, and sitting here in the middle you certainly cannot put all of the blame on our side when there are two great powers apparently involved in this conflict. In other words, is the policy of the Soviet Union imperialistic in any respect?"

Again the translation was made. I received the same rather unfriendly glance and then a very interesting answer. Said Mr. Togliatti, "Again the Congressman and I are not speaking or understanding quite the same language. The reason why the foreign policy of the United States is imperialistic is that it is dominated by employers, reactionaries and capitalists. In the Soviet Union we have no employers, reactionaries or capitalists. Therefore, it is impossible for the foreign policy of the Soviet Union to be imperialistic. It is a people's policy, it is always right and is never subject to any criticism whatever."

I asked the same series of questions of Arthur Horner, the head of the miners' union in Britain and received the same answers cloaked in a British accent. I have asked the same series of questions of William Z. Foster, in a little different way, of course, because he happens to be an American citizen. Very pertinent for our purposes is the testimony of Foster before the Judiciary Committee in 1948 which was considering legislation to control the Communist Party in the United States. Senator Ferguson of Michigan questioned him at length as to whether members of the Communist Party of the United States would fight on the side of the United States in the event of an aggressive war begun by the Soviet Union. For approximately thirty minutes, Foster, in a very able display of mental footwork and gymnastics, side stepping, twisting, and turning, contended over and over again that the question was hypothetical because he said it was impossible for him to conceive of an aggressive war by a people's government, to wit, the Soviet Union. Therefore, in his estimation it was not necessary for him to determine whether or not he, or other members of the Communist Party would fight in such a war because it was impossible that such a war could occur. These examples are sufficient to show the global character of the Communist threat.

Accordingly, it seems to me that we made a basic mistake in failing to realize this fact. The Communist, wherever he exists, whether in Moscow, China, Korea or in the United States is essentially the same--owing his loyalty not to his own country, in the event that he is not a citizen of the Soviet Union or a satellite country, but to the power center, the Soviet Union, and to others who control the world Communist



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conspiracy. Yugoslavia, of course, is the present exception which proves the rule. Thus, I conclude that our mistaken evaluation of the global nature of the Communist strategy had much to do with the failure of our policy in China.

Compare, for example, the policy that we adopted in Greece with what we adopted in China. Though the terrain was much smaller and the complexity of the Grecian problem not at all as great, we could have applied to China some of the recognition of the Communist threat which motivated our actions in Greece in 1947. Over and over again we repeated the theme that the Chinese Nationalist Government was corrupt, that it was unstable and for those reasons that the support we had given was no good and no further help was justified. I was in Greece in 1947 and if there was any more corrupt or unstable government in the world than what Greece had in 1947, I would like to have seen it. It changed twice in two weeks while I was there and, yet, what did we do? We went in there and General Van Fleet did a magnificent job of training the Greeks so that they could defend themselves. As a result of our positive action, the Greeks met the Communist threat and met it effectively and at the present time, with our continued support, Greece is still on our side. Thus, as we look at the situation in Asia, it would seem that some of the same medicine possibly might have made the difference.

All of these, of course, are problems and mistakes which have been made in the past and the question is: Where do we go from here? As we analyze the problem of the immediate and distant future, may I say again that the only reason we discussed the past today is to make sure that we do not make those same mistakes tomorrow. As we determine where we go from here, I consider it proper that we look at some basic factors. The first basic one is: What do we want? Well, we want peace, not peace at any price, of course, but certainly peace at as high a price as we can pay without losing the honor of our nation. Secondly, the United States will never use war as an instrument of policy. Our Secretary of State underscored in a very effective manner this point before he went to Europe. However, the Kremlin, when confronted by a potential enemy, will use war as an instrument of policy, and so the key to peace is to see what actions or failures to act on our part will cause the Kremlin to act or fail to act at a critical time. Accordingly, it is appropriate that we analyze from all viewpoints the enemy with whom we are dealing--the man in the Kremlin, the man who is trained and brought up on the bibles which the Communists read and follow, viz., Marx, Lenin, Stalin. Without prying too deeply we are confronted with certain conclusions which are inescapable. First, the men in the Kremlin are realists. Hence, though they are bent on world revolution, though they will use war as an instrument of policy, they will not begin a world war until they are convinced they can win it. Second, they have a sense of history in that they are willing to wait not only through their own lifetimes but even longer than that, if it takes such time to reach the point where they can



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win the world conflict. Therefore, if we want peace, we must do several things. First, we must exert every effort to make sure that in the world the balance of power, from a military standpoint, is actually in our favor so that the Kremlin could not win a war if it began one. By the words, "in our favor," I do not mean quantity as much as I stress quality of arms and adequate training. Secondly, we must make the men in the Kremlin believe that the military balance, to which we have just referred, is in our favor because if they actually miscalculate by arriving at erroneous conclusions by reason of something we have done or failed to do, then, regardless of the power balance, war will come. Thus, I cannot overstress the importance of making sure that the military balance of power is actually on our side and to underscore our responsibility to make sure that we do nothing which will cause the men in the Kremlin to miscalculate our strength and begin a major world war, which, in a sense, no one will win. Thirdly, we must acknowledge that besides our military strength at home, we need allies abroad, because 150 million people obviously cannot stand up against 800 million people. Not only do we need allies but we need as many as we can get.

And so, the policies of the next few years, in large measure, will have to continue the policies which have developed during the past seven years, particularly with regard to Europe. If we keep the United States militarily strong at home, we must strive to get as many militarily strong allies as we can abroad.

But military strength alone is not enough. In this struggle for the world we are confronted with men who are very pragmatic about what they need to achieve their goals of conquest. Thus, they have developed new tactics of aggression with which you are familiar and which have proved themselves successful. Let's face the stark fact that by such tactics 600 million people have been won by the Soviets in seven years without the loss of a single Russian soldier in combat--at least none admittedly lost in combat. These new tactics of aggression developed by the Soviets do not contemplate the use of armed force involving the armies of the power center, itself--the Soviet Union. What are such techniques? Some of them, of course, are quite obvious.

a. The use of internal subversion, employing not only the traditional foreign agents but also agents who are nationals of the countries involved. Czechoslovakia is, perhaps, the most striking example of how a nation can be taken over through a coup d'etat in which the principals were Czechs and, yet, they owed their allegiance to a foreign power.

b. Next is the fomenting of revolution. This tactic used in various parts of the world, in Asia particularly, has been



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quite obviously employed in China. And again we note the instances in which the involuntary forces are made up of nationals of the countries involved and in which the forces of the USSR power center are not committed.

c. Extremely important is the great new weapon of economic, political, and psychological warfare.

Our answer, to some extent, is quite obvious. First, on the economic side, we must be as sound at home as we can possibly be--that means balance. There are times, undoubtedly, when you may wonder why the Congress hesitates to approve appropriation requests for funds which you feel are needed for adequate military purposes or for foreign aid programs. I can assure you that this is not negativism on the part of the Congress but rather a sober attitude to be convinced of the necessity for the expenditures, because the greatest asset the free world has in the present struggle, and the importance of this point was emphasized in President Eisenhower's State-of-the-Union message, is a sound, free, productive, American economy. Thus the total program of the nation must be in balance, and I am sure that the policies recommended to the President by the National Security Council will always aim at achieving this result, namely, that we give as much support as we can to the development and maintenance of needed military strength for ourselves and the free world without destroying the basic economy which is our greatest asset and advantage in the battle for civilization in which we are engaged. This will demand of us that, while we maintain a sound economy at home in realistic fashion, we must shore up the economy of nations abroad so that they, themselves, may be militarily strong and, also, that they may develop a strong economy, because in such a climate, there is less likelihood that the Communist conspirator will be able to appeal to the masses of the people and sell his doctrines.

This last point compels me to inject a word of warning. I do not subscribe to the views of those who say that the answer to Communism, whether in the United States or abroad, is solely economic well being. Any of you who analyze this point will reach the same conclusion which is already expressed in the Bible that man does not live by bread alone. Economic strength is, of course, a definite factor entering into the present struggle. Certainly, where economic unrest prevails and hunger exists, you have a fertile field in which the Communist ideas can grow and prosper. But economic strength alone is not the complete answer, and I use again the classic example of Czechoslovakia. There was probably a no more advanced country in Europe at the time of the coup d'etat than that nation, and, yet, the Communist movement flourished and in a most effective manner.



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In addition to economic soundness, we must have internal security at home. I won't belabor that point because I believe it is in good hands at the present time. This is a most difficult problem, and I can imagine that some of you who have followed the work of some of us, as we have investigated subversive activities in the United States, are concerned about these investigations and the trend that they take in this country. I think, perhaps, that some concern is justified, because a very delicate balance must be maintained in this field between security on the one side and freedom on the other. This is not always easy to maintain.

I am sure that if you took a vote of the Congress of the United States--a secret vote, or perhaps, a public one--they would support a movement to put all the Communists in this country in one boat and ship them to the USSR, even though, of course, that might be technically impossible. That, however, gives you an idea of the temper of the Congress on this problem. This is somewhat symbolic of other easy solutions which are offered: for example, the outlawing of the Communist Party in the United States. This sounds laudable and easy but; unfortunately, as indicated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, this is an unworkable solution. Therefore, we must be constantly on our guard that we do not resort to totalitarian police methods in dealing with the conspiracy in this country and, thus, adopt within our own borders the methods which we have criticized in our enemies abroad for dealing with dissidents in their countries. I leave with you the conviction that those of us who have been in the Congressional investigative field and others who are presently engaged in this activity have a realization of how constant care must be exerted not to kill the patient we are attempting to cure.

Finally, I believe we will all agree that the bolstering of our national defense in the development of political and psychological counterattack is essential. For example, I think that President Eisenhower's announcement that the Seventh Fleet would no longer be used to blockade the Chinese Communist coast from raids from Formosa, and his statement that a request would be made on the Congress for a resolution to repudiate secret agreements are worthwhile examples of taking the offensive in psychological warfare, besides the fact that, from other standpoints, these steps should have a great effect. Such steps as these mean only two things when they are interpreted to the world. One is that we back our friends and the other that we will not write off the captive peoples. So much for analyzing the Congressional mind--assuming that any Congressman or Senator has a mind. That, I admit, is a debatable point!



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Now, what is our new policy to be? First of all, I believe that the general outlines of that policy have been set forth in President Eisenhower's State-of-the-Union message and in the recent speech by Secretary of State, Dulles. I do think that a summary of that policy, as I see it, might be appropriate and of interest at this time. Basically, the new policy represents a change in attitude--a change in emphasis. I am sure that we are not going to see too many evidences of drastic moves which would indicate to the people of this country, or to the peoples of the world, that the policy is of a radically new type. The action regarding the Seventh Fleet, the pronouncement regarding secret agreements are good examples of this appreciation. In this analysis we inevitably grapple with the word "containment". Even though the policy concepts underlying "containment" may have served some useful purpose up to the present time, which I rather doubt, still, I believe that we have arrived at the point where the word "containment" means a static policy--a draw in the conflict in which we are engaged. In fact, it means victory for neither side. What we have failed to realize is that the alternative to "containment" is not all-out, total war but rather the winning of the cold war. As President Eisenhower indicated, only by winning the cold war can we avoid the hot war. To achieve this goal of tangible victory, some immediate objectives come to mind:

First. The most difficult goal of all is the winning of the war in Korea. Victory in Korea is of prime concern to our nation. I know that some peculiar arguments can be made, but always in quiet fashion -- never in the open, because you could never convince the American people of this -- contending that the continuance of the war in Korea is a good thing for the United States. Supporting this spurious position are statements to the effect that we should look at the casualty ratio in Korea--five to one in our favor. Now, this position is untenable because it is political dynamite which the people of the United States would never buy, and, furthermore, approaching it from just the standpoint of a layman, it would seem to me that all we have to do is realize that in the past two years or so of the Korean war, we have suffered 130 thousand casualties and the Soviet Union hasn't had any. Again, it is the old problem of keeping our eye on the main target, and winning the current war in Korea must be the first objective of such a policy.

Second. Our second objective, which is, of course, related to our past policy, is to allow no further solidification of Soviet holdings in satellite countries and no extension of their boundaries, because it is obvious that if they forge strength within their dynasty and bring further terrain under their command, they may calculate that they can begin a war--a World War--and win it.



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Third. We must avoid trouble at home and keep under control the inevitable problems which we will have with the nations which we consider to be on our side. Without this approach, the strength which we develop will be sapped of its potency.

Finally, and this is the most important ingredient in what we mean by "dynamic" policy, is to roll back the enemy strength if we possibly can. Even though some consideration of this factor existed in past policy, I am convinced that we are going to see a stepping up of attitude and emphasis to reduce Soviet gains, to puncture the Communist conspiracy and to stir up just as much trouble as we possibly can in the satellite countries and in the Soviet Union proper.

This is a big order--a very big order. The objectives we have outlined certainly have been in the minds of our policy makers during the past two or three years. They are in our minds today, and we are hopeful that we will be able to translate these concepts into appropriate actions. Regardless of our thinking in wishful manner for easy answers, we must constantly admonish ourselves that in this field of foreign policy there are none.

The objectives for an affirmative foreign policy can be attained only by the support which policy makers must receive from you. I speak now as a member of the Administration and as a member of the National Security Council, which is the greatest consumer of your product, to emphasize that knowledge of the facts is essential if we are to make the right decisions. Essentially, that is why we have to have intelligence. Perhaps the best proof of this point is the rather obvious truth that with better intelligence support our nation might have avoided most of our present difficulties. Better intelligence might have put our leaders on notice as to the true character of the Communists, the men in the Kremlin, the men we were dealing with across the table at Yalta, Potsdam and Teheran. Better intelligence might have given us a greater appreciation of the overall global character of the Communist movement. For example, if we had better intelligence, we might not have made, what I think was, a fatal error in judgment as to the character of the Chinese Communist movement in the early days of its development. We would have known that the Chinese Communist was no different, essentially, than his counterpart in the satellite countries in eastern Europe and that, therefore, the choice in China was not between a Nationalist Government and something better but between the Nationalist Government and something far, far worse. This, therefore, is your job, to gather and analyze in impartial manner all the facts and to make the findings available to those who have to make the policy.



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I recognize that this is a tough job. I know that some of your assignments will be dangerous and, simultaneously, interesting. I realize, also, that many of you have already served well in difficult undertakings. In an organization of this type, which must be a kind of silent shock absorber, I can imagine that there are times when your tasks seem boring and maybe completely meaningless, because you may not be in a position to see the entire picture. Hence, when you are tempted to ask yourselves such questions as: "Why do we get this?" "Why do we have to spend precious time in such tasks as these?" I admonish you to have confidence in those who direct your activities, and without allowing your efforts to be neutralized, that you do the job which has been assigned to you, because, I say this advisedly, there is no job in our present government which, I think, is more important than the task which you ladies and gentlemen will be doing in the years ahead.

In my experiences as a Congressional investigator of Communist activities in the United States, I have been impressed by a number of things, but particularly, by the kind of people who have become Communists in our country. Though most of you are knowledgeable in this field, my own conclusions may interest you. What kind of men were Alger Hiss, John Apt, Nathan Witt, Lee Pressman, Victor Perlo and, I will add, incidentally, the atomic scientists and others who came before our committee and refused to answer questions on the grounds of incrimination? What kind of people were they? First of all, they were all born in the United States and, secondly, they were sensitive, intelligent, able people. Almost without exception, they were the graduates of the best colleges and universities of this country. Not one of them acted just for monetary gain but was motivated by fanatical belief and devotion in the cause in which he was working. Each believed so deeply that he was willing to do anything for the cause--a boring job, if need be. He was also willing to do a very dangerous job--one that would run the danger of a jail sentence and of holding himself and his family up to disgrace in his community and among his friends. Often have I thought, during the past three to four years, as I have seen these people parade before us--these young, intelligent, able people--of the need for people on our side as devoted to our cause as Communists are devoted to theirs.

When I was in Europe in 1947 and again in 1951, I had the opportunity to talk privately with three or four individuals who were members of this Agency. I saw in those individuals what is certainly the answer I have been looking for--the answer to the devotion which the Communists have on their side. I know that it takes a devoted and dedicated man or woman to do the job that you are doing. This may sound like flag waving to you, but most sincerely do I conclude on this note: The conflict in which we are engaged in the world is great and complex. It is military



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in character, economic in character, political in character. But, over all, it is a conflict for the minds and the hearts and the souls of men. Our enemies are dedicated to their cause. We need dedicated people on our side. General Smith, to you and to Mr. Dulles do I say, as a member of this Administration, and I know that I represent the views of the Commander-in-Chief, the President, we are very proud to have serving the United States a group of dedicated men and women--the people who are members of this Agency. Good luck and Godspeed!



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